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ABSTRACT 
Obstruction has often been regarded as an abhorrent feature of 
American legislatures, but few attempts have been made to specify the 
conditions under which it occurs or the precise nature and degree of 
its putative evil. This paper presents a theory of decentralized 
decisionmaking that specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for sophisticated obstruction by committees. The assumptions of the 
theory are embedded in a simulation model which generates preferences 
and status quo points, identifies outcomes under competing behavioral 
assumptions, and estimates the representativeness of outcomes as a 
function of legislators' ideal points. The results call for rejection 
of the hypothesis that obstruction leads to unrepresentative outcomes. 
A discussion of the House' s discharge petition examines the findings 
in a richer congressional context. 
OBSTRUCTION, GERMANENESS AND REPRESENTATIVENESS 
IN LEGISLATURES 
Keith Krehbiel 
Obstruction is a frequently criticized fact of congressional 
life, but more often than not the Senate's rule for extended debate is 
the target of such criticism, as well as the focus of scholarly works 
on legislative rules and strategies. Studies of Senate filibusters 
have spanned several decades and include works by Burdette (1940), 
Galloway (1958), Schuman (1957), Rosenthal (1962), Keynes (1969), 
Wolfinger (1971) and Foley (1980). Yet during each session of 
Congress, hundreds of bills die less conspicuously than those 
relatively few victims of the filibuster. Every stage in the 
legislative process is a potential veto point. Thus in the House, for 
example, some bills are deliberately held up by leaders who are 
reluctant to schedule legislation for floor consideration, and other 
bills are permanently stalled in the Rules Committee (Robinson, 1963; 
Oppenheimer, 1981). Even legislation successful enough to receive 
consideration on the floor is often amended to such a degree that it 
"sinks of its own weight" (Oleszek, 1978, p. 116). And if the 
typically open amendment procedure is not fatal and bills pass both 
Houses, then there still remains the possibility of obstruction in 
conference committee if conferees are unable (or unwilling) to reach 
agreement. 
Given that so many bills die in each session of Congress, how bad 
is the obstruction that is so often responsible? This paper addresses 
that question with several departures from previous studies of 
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congressional rules and strategies. First, the focus is on the House 
rather than the Senate, and more specifically on obstruction by 
standing committees. Second, the study is primarily theoretical 
rather than empirical, and thus attempts to abstract from Congress 
only those elements of decentralized (two-stage) decisionmaking needed 
to expose the necessary and sufficient conditions for rational, 
obstructive committee behavior. Third, "bad outcomes" are given a 
precise, normatively based meaning by defining representativeness in 
terms of the elements of the theory. And finally, a simulation 
technique is devised and employed in order to estimate the effects of 
committee obstruction on the representativeness of legislative 
outcomes. Rather than argue that the uniqueness of this approach is a 
substitute for more conventional empirical analyses, I merely suggest 
that it is a supplement that offers some useful preliminary insights 
about institutional design, political strategy, and the quality of 
collective choice. 
INGREDIENTS OF THE THEORY 
Hundreds of rules impose order on the legislative process. In 
this paper no more than a few such rules will be discussed, since the 
objective is to extract from Congress only its most essential 
features. The theory builds on abstract definitions of a committee 
system, a jurisdictional system, and a germaneness rule for offering 
amendments. These key institutional ingredients are presented first, 
after which assumptions about preferences and strategies of 
legislators are discussed.1 
Institutional ingredients. Congress is structurally 
decentralized; its decisions are made in two or more distinct stages 
by different (sub)sets of members. Decisions often originate in 
subcommittees, always pass through committees, and only sometimes 
reach the floor for consideration by the full membership. 
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Accordingly, committees are central to the proposed theory. The 
initial assumption is that Congress consists of a finite set of 
individuals.2 A congressional committee is a proper subset of the 
entire membership of the parent body, therefore a committee system can 
be viewed as a mechanism that assigns members to committees, each of 
which contains some, but not all, members. Among other reasons, the 
committee system divides the membership so that initial decisions, 
such as the drafting of bills, can be made more efficiently, perhaps 
by members who over the years have developed expertise in the 
jurisdiction of the committee. 
In the abstract, a jurisdictional system assigns policy domains 
to committees, just as the committee system assigns members to 
committees. Policy domains are subjects about which Congress makes 
decisions. Thus, for example, in one jurisdiction a subset of actors 
(committee) is given the right to write bills declaring how much to 
tax; in another jurisdiction, a different subset formulates initial 
proposals defining limits to imports, and so on. 
A special form of committee-jurisdictional arrangement in which 
the jurisdictions of committees are unidimensional and nonoverlapping 
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is called a simple institutional arrangement, or SIA. Practically 
speaking, the unidimensionality of SIAs guarantees that the policy 
domain of each committee is narrowly defined, while the nonoverlapping 
jurisdiction requirement ensures that committees cannot confront one 
another about proposals in the same policy domain. Thus, for example, 
if a given committee has jurisdiction over a education, it possesses 
the exclusive right to report to the floor bills pertaining to 
education. It effectively has a monopoly over the first stage of 
decisionmaking on education. Reasons for focusing on SIAs are not 
limited to matters of convenience. First, the theory is an 
appropriate depiction of at least some congressional decisionmaking. 
Not all committees and jurisdictions in Congress are so neatly 
constructed, but many of them approximate SIAs in many instances. To 
that degree, the results that follow, though abstract,_pertain to 
Congress. A second reason for considering decisionmaking only in SIAs 
is a desire to minimize the number of assumptions in the theory. 
Although the theory could incorporate more detailed rules and 
procedures of congressional decisionmaking, the advantage of starting 
simple is the ease with which effects can be attributed to causes. 
The final institutional ingredient in the theory is the rule that 
governs the offering of amendments by noncommittee members to bills 
reported by committees. In the House of Representatives, such rules 
are written for legislation by the Rules Committee and voted on by the 
full House before debate on legislation commences. Although such 
rules are often complex (Bach, 1981a; 1981b), there are but two pure 
types -- open and closed. Under the pure open rule, any member may 
offer any amendment; under the pure closed rule, no member may offer 
an amendment of any kind. The focus here is on the House's most 
common variant of the open rule, which allows amendments to be 
offered, provided they are germane to the legislation under 
consideration.3 In the context of SIAs and the House's germaneness 
restriction, the open rule permits any member to offer any amendment 
to a piece of legislation referred by a committee, so long as the 
amendment changes policy only in the designated jurisdiction of that 
committee. 
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Preferences. Each member of the legislature is assumed to have 
single-peaked and symmetric preferences in every jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, there exists on each jurisdiction a status quo point 
which represents the policy at the start of the session. Figure 1 is 
an illustration of a configuration of preferences and a status quo 
point on a unidimensional jurisdiction, x. For the sake of 
simplicity, only five members' preferences are shown. Solid dots 
denote most-preferred (or ideal) alternatives for given committee 
members. By assumption, these three members have exclusive power to 
select initial proposals (bills). Hollow dots are ideal points of 
members not on the committee. The horizontal axis represents the set 
of alternatives from which a given committee can choose, and the 
vertical axis reflects the degree to which members value the 
alternatives. Notice, of course, that points directly below the peak 
of any given curve are ideal points. Moreover, for any given 
individual, the farther an alternative is from his ideal point, the 
less he values the alternative. Thus, all preference curves are 
single-peaked. Finally, the diamond above the "S" denotes the status 
quo. 
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Strategies. Given the institutional setting in which actors make 
decisions, how do actors express their preferences thereby producing a 
collective decision? This question requires a final, contrasting pair 
of assumptions about the strategies of individuals. The most common 
and readily available assumption about individual decisions is that of 
sincere voting.4 In a majority rule, plurality voting setting, such 
as Congress, a voter votes sincerely if, when given a set of two or 
more alternatives, he always casts his vote for the alternative he 
prefers most. Under the assumption of sincere voting, the outcomes in 
each of the two stages of voting based on the configuration of 
preferences in Figure 1 is easily predicted. In the committee stage 
any number of amendments can be offered. But one and only one is 
assured of beating all others, namely, the point CM, which is the 
ideal point of the committee' s median voter. Many readers will 
recognize this as an application of Black' s Theorem (1958). After the 
committee reports CM to the floor as its bill, a virtually identical 
process takes place. Under the germaneness rule, amendments along 
this dimension are offered freely and openly. But if one such 
amendment is the point FM -- the floor median voter' s ideal point 
that amendment cannot be defeated. Thus the second-stage and final 
outcome under sincere voting, Osv' is always the point, FM. 
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How realistic is the assumption of sincere voting in the given 
institutional setting? Two possible objections quickly come to mind, 
one for each of the stages of decisionmaking. First, will FM come up 
on the floor? According to the germaneness rule, it may come up. 
Furthermore, unless the floor median voter is ignorant, lazy, or both, 
it will come up. There are few moderates in Congress who, having been 
elected, are not aware of the natural vote-getting ability of moderate 
positions. Thus, given a rule that affords them the luxury of 
amending legislation, such members are not likely to pass up the 
opportunity to make their most-preferred position the law of the land. 
At the very least, outcomes under such circumstances will be very 
close to the floor median position. 
The second question is whether, similarly, CM will be offered in 
committee. Since there is no explicit open rule in committees, the 
convergence to the median would appear less certain, at least upon 
first reflection. Committee chairmen whose ideal points are far from 
CM may be inclined to refuse to recognize motions from median members, 
in which case bills in their final marked-up state (if the mark-up 
occurs) may not resemble CM. However plausible such a scenario might 
seem in Congresses dominated by autocratic committee chairmen, such as 
several Southerners during the '50s and early ' 60s, it is much less 
realistic in the aftermath of reforms of the ' 70s. A number of 
studies have suggested that today' s committee backbenchers are no 
longer beholden to autocratic chairmen. Price for example, writes 
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• . •  this autonomy [of committee chairmen], to be sure, is not 
what it once was. Recent coqgressional history contains numerous 
examples of leaders who were deposed and prospective leaders who 
were denied their slots because they were judged hostile to the 
interests of a caucus or committee majority (1981, p.172). 
And Oppenheimer argues that 
• • •  committee chairs can no longer arbitrarily delay 
legislation that is central to the leadership's legislative 
program unless they have substantive support from their committee 
members (1980, p.8) 
Thus the blocking of popular bills, which by definition CM is, seems 
increasingly improbable, and the case for expecting median outcomes in 
committees, too, is strengthened. 
But there is a final objection to the committee median outcomes 
as described above -- one that is more persuasive in at least some 
contemporary congressional settings. Whereas the earlier discussion 
about amendments on the floor addressed the question of whether actors 
possessed the minimal sophistication required merely to offer a 
clearly popular amendment, this one questions whether they aren't 
perhaps still more sophisticated. Specifically, consider more 
carefully the situation of committee members in Figure 1. We know 
that the final outcome under the assumption of sincere voting is FM. 
If committee members are similarly knowledgeable, will they not modify 
their behavior? Can they not do better than FM? The answer is yes; 
they can do better by doing nothing, that is, by refusing to report 
any legislation to the floor. This, of course, leaves intact the 
status quo point, which a majority of committee members prefers to the 
sincere outcome, FM. 
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For a committee to successfully obstruct in this fashion requires 
actors of greater sophistication than those discussed above. 
Minimally, committee members must know something about the preferences 
of members on the floor. Furthermore, given information about 
preferences in the parent chamber, they must be able to predict what 
will happen to their legislation if it is reported to the floor under 
an open rule. Finally, given the information and subsequent 
prediction, they merely need to compare the predicted outcome with the 
outcome they collectively can guarantee, namely, the status quo. In 
effect, these conditions ensure that astute committee members can 
detect situations that are in some sense "ripe" for obstruction, 
moreover, obstruction that yields a majority on the committee an 
outcome preferable to the otherwise expected FM. 
Such situations can be defined precisely with tools already in 
the theory. First, we define a ripe situation under the open rule, as 
one in which the committee median voter (cm) prefers the status quo 
(S) to the ideal point of the floor median voter (FM). Formally, we 
say 
A situation is ripe for obstruction if and only if 
1. the open (germaneness) rule is in effect, and 
2. S 6m FM. 
If preference curves are symmetric as well as single-peaked, then 
ripe situations are all of those, and only those, in which S is 
geometrically closer to CM than is FM. Figure 2 shows one ripe and 
10 
one nonripe situation. Notice in Figure 1 and Figure 2a that in ripe 
situations, obstruction yields an outcome that a majority on the 
committee prefers to FM, the predicted outcome under the open rule if 
a bill is reported. 5 In contrast, obstruction in nonripe situations, 
such as in Figure 2b, makes a committee majority worse off than 
referral and convergence to the floor median. 
The definition of ripeness for obstruction enables us to define 
an alternative behavioral assumption to sincere voting, namely, 
committee sophistication under the open rule. 
A committee is sophisticated under the open rule if and only if 
whenever the situation is ripe for obstruction, its members 
refuse to report a bill. 
The possibility of the occurrence of sophisticated obstruction by 
a committee, of course, could not exist without the jurisdictional 
system which confers to the committee the exclusive right to make 
decisions in a given policy area. Committee sophistication is 
therefore a distinctly institutionally-bestowed strategic possibility, 
as are many of the strategies we observe in Congress. 
Given two possible assumptions -- sincere voting or committee 
sophistication -- which one is more appropriate? Few if any 
propositions about congressional committees have been more frequently 
cited or more widely endorsed than Fenno's (1973) admonition that 
committees differ. It seems only reasonable that one dimension on 
which they differ is the level of sophistication their members 
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exhibit, and that one indicator of such sophistication is the degree 
to which committee members are attentive to the preferences of their 
colleagues in the parent chamber. Fenno writes, for example, that 
"the Interior Committee • • •  worries about these problems and 
incorporates a good deal of sensitivity to the House into its 
strategic thinking. By comparison, Education and Labor does not" 
(p. 78). Thus, in the context of obstruction, we can assume that some 
committees exhibit foresight; their members are cognizant of ripe 
situations and act in the interests of a majority on the committee by 
obstructing. But other committees, whose members tend to be less 
experienced at gauging preferences of noncommittee members or less 
inclined reach the collective decision to obstruct, are better modeled 
by the assumption of sincere voting. In short, the question -- Which 
assumption is more appropriate? -- is improperly stated. Each is 
appropriate in some congressional settings, and only by studying 
comparatively the outcomes under the two contrasting assumptions can 
assessments of the quality of obstructed versus nonobstructed outcomes 
be meaningful. Thus, the "So what?" question. Is obstruction good or 
bad, and good or bad in what sense? Clearly, if we are to assess the 
merits or demerits of obstruction, we need to know more precisely what 
a good outcome is. That is, we need to select and define a dependent 
variable that possesses some normatively attractive properties. 
REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Congress is usually considered a representative decisionmaking 
institution, therefore a natural question for anyone interested in 
assessing its performance is: How representative are congressional 
outcomes? Specifically, how well do congressional decisions reflect 
the preferences of congressmen? An operational definition of 
representativeness will be given shortly, but first it is useful to 
emphasize the narrowness of representativeness, relative to the 
related concept of representation. Stated in terms of Congress and 
the ingredients of the theory presented above, representation refers 
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to the degree to which the preferences of members of Congress reflect 
the preferences of their constituents and, similarly, the degree to 
which the actions or strategies of congressmen reflect their 
constituents' preferences. Representation, then, is an attribute of 
congressmen's preferences and strategies. Representativeness, in 
contrast, is an attribute of congressional outcomes. 
A more precise definition of representativeness is acquired by 
exploiting the spatial characteristics of the theory of decentralized 
decisionmaking in SIAs. The initial question is: given a 
configuration of preferences representable as points on a policy 
dimension, which outcome in the set of all possible outcomes within a 
jurisdiction can best be defended as representative? Our knowledge of 
Congress as a fundamentally democratic institution suggests that two 
criteria are reasonable, indeed essential, for determining the 
location such a point, on which the measure of representativeness will 
be based. 
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Egalitarianism. All members' ideal points should be considered 
and should be weighted equally in the computation of the 
representative point. 
Positive Responsiveness. The representative point should respond 
positively to any change in any member's ideal point. 
The egalitarianism criterion ensures that all members' 
preferences count and that no member's preference counts more than 
that of anyone else. The criterion of positive responsiveness ensures 
that if any single member's ideal point changes, the representative 
point must change also, moreover, it must change in the same direction 
as the individual's ideal point. For example, imagine two consecutive 
Congresses, the latter of which is identical to the former except that 
one Democrat has been replaced by a more conservative Republican. If 
all nonfreshmen legislators' preferences are static, then a positive 
response of the representative point to the single instance of 
turnover must occur and must be in a conservative direction. 
* 
We label the representative point P , since once defined it is a 
* 
summary of individual ideal points, pi, such as those shown on Figure 
* 
1. Natural candidates for P are summary statistics of the array of
preferences. The median has an attractive tendency to be centrally 
located, and additionally is the predictive outcome under the 
assumption of sincere voting. But predictability bears no necessary 
relationship to representativeness, so this feature shall not 
* 
influence our choice. Confining our attention to the criteria for P , 
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we see that the median does not meet the condition of positive 
responsiveness, since it is quite possible for ideal preference points 
to change without the median changing in response. The mean, however, 
does not possess this drawback. Moreover, if unweighted, it also 
meets the criterion of egalitarianism. We therefore define the 
* 
optimally representative point, P , for M members as follows: 
* p 
M 
1/M I 
i=l 
* 
pi (1) 
The numerical definition of representativeness now follows in two 
simple steps. First, define the loss of representativeness, L, as the 
distance between p* and the actual outcome, 0: 
L f p* - O( (2) 
Now define representativeness of the outcome, R, as the maximum 
possible loss minus the actual loss, where the maximum loss equals the 
distance from the highest to lowest points on the jurisdiction: 
R L - L max 
The proposed measure of representativeness not only satisfies the 
democratically appealing criteria of egalitarianism and positive 
responsiveness but also makes it possible to assess precisely the 
(3) 
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effect of obstruction on the quality of outcomes. 
ESTIMATION 
We employ a simulation technique to perform three tasks: 
generation of congressionally realistic preferences and status quo 
points, simulation of outcomes (based on the two different assumptions 
of committee strategy), and assessment of the outcomes in terms of 
representativeness. The first task is perhaps most difficult, but 
previous empirical work provides some guidance. We know not only of 
the existence of parties in Congress, but also of the tendency of 
their members to have preferences that differ systematically. The 
patterns show up clearly in scores given to congressmen by various 
interest groups. COPE scores, for example, when broken down by party, 
indicate that distributions are unimodal and skewed for each party, 
but with party modes on opposite sides of the distribution. The 
distributions shown in Figure 3, as well as all others examined, 
approximate a gamma distribution, from which, accordingly, the. 
simulation program randomly selects individual preferences. The 
arbitrary boundaries of the policy dimension in the program are 0 and 
10; the means for the two parties are set at 3.0 and 7.0; and the 
standard deviations are fixed at 2.0.6 
For reasons of computational efficiency and clarity of 
presentation of later examples, the size of the legislature is set at 
seven.7 The partisan balance of the simulated legislature is then
fixed in accordance with the contemporary Congress. As of this 
writing, 61 percent of the House is Democratic. Thus if we allow four 
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members (57 percent) to be majority party members, we are reasonably 
close to the composition of the House. Of the three committee 
members, two will be from the majority party. In sum, the composition 
is: 
L L R L L R R 
where "L" denotes a member from the party whose distribution is skewed 
to the left, "R" is a member from the right-skewed party, and members 
to the left of the vertical bar belong to the focal committee.8 The 
final task is to specify the selection of the status quo point. This 
parameter setting, unlike previous ones, is problematic since 
sensitivity tests showed that status quo points drawn from different 
distributions sometimes create different patterns of 
representativeness in different institutional arrangements. The 
primary criterion for selecting status quo parameters must, of course, 
be theoretical sensibility. If one accepts the assumption that past 
Congresses are at least somewhat successful at producing outcomes that 
reflect members' preferences, then the status quo point should not be 
completely random, but rather should be linked to such preferences in 
a somewhat, but not entirely, predictable manner. Lacking empirical 
guidance as to the proper functional form, I use a normal distribution 
whose expected value is the mean of the ideal points of congressmen. 
Specifically, the status quo point is: 
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s p + e, 
where e is a normally distributed stochastic disturbance with µe = o 
and ae yet unspecified. Substantively, the random component of the 
equation reflects exogenous factors such as turnover, war, and 
economic conditions (each of which may cause changes in preferences) 
as well as the inability of the past Congresses to make decisions that 
reflect the preferences of members. Sensitivity tests showed the size 
of the variance of the stochastic component also affects the results 
in some situations. Therefore two samples will be examined; in Sample 
I ae is small (0.5), and in Sample II it is large (1.5). Of course, 
it would be advantageous if real-world studies of representativeness 
informed these estimates. Until such studies exist, however, there is 
no choice but to begin with values believed to be reasonable � priori. 
For each of the two samples, 1000 decisionmaking situations were 
generated,9 where a "situation" is defined as a configuration of 
randomly drawn preferences and a status quo point. For each 
situation, two outcomes were simulated -- one, Osv' under the 
assumption of sincere voting by committee members, and one, Ocs' under 
the assumption of committee sophistication (i.e., obstruction in ripe 
situations). This research design not only gives a clear answer to 
the question "What if committee members had behaved differently?" but 
also ensures that differences in the average estimates for the 
competing behavioral assumptions are indeed attributable to the 
assumptions, and not to different samples. 
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RESULTS 
The primary objective is to estimate and to better understand the 
probable effect of obstruction on representativeness. Thus, the 
independent variable in the analysis is committee sophistication, 
which, in open rule settings, is synonymous with obstruction whenever 
the situation is ripe. The dependent variable is the 
representativeness of the outcome, as measured by equation (3). The 
simulation program is constructed to test the null hypothesis that 
obstruction by committees produces unrepresentative outcomes. 
Recall first the theoretical result that the open rule ensures a 
floor median outcome (0 = FM) whenever the committee reports a bill, 
indeed any bill, to the floor. Therefore, the only situations in 
which the representativeness of outcomes may differ under the two 
behavioral assumptions is when the sophisticated committee obstructs, 
that is, in ripe situations. Thus an initial concern is how 
frequently ripe situations occur. Indeed, they are common in both 
samples. In Sample I, 303 (30.3 percent) of the 1000 situations were 
ripe; in Sample II, 251 (25.1 percent) percent were ripe. 
Whereas ripe situations are probably not rare, we next explore 
the qualitative implications of ripeness and, more specifically, of 
the obstruction that occurs in ripe situations if committees are 
sophisticated. The first evidence comes from the mean estimates of 
representativess in ripe situations, as presented in Table 1. In both 
samples, the average representativeness of outcomes is quite high, 
irrespective of the behavioral assumptions. Even the lowest estimate 
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of representativenss -- the obstructed outcomes in Sample II -- fall 
within one unit of the representative point, on average. Thus, to the 
degree that the assumptions of the simulation are congressionally 
realistic, Congress does a good job at yielding outcomes that reflect 
configurations of its members preferences.10 
But the generally high absolute values of average 
representativeness mask several interesting and sometimes surprising 
results. First, obstruction often results in outcomes that are more 
representative than those which would have occurred through the open 
amendment process. This is especially the case in the first of the 
two samples, where not only are 63 percent of obstructions beneficial 
to representativeness but also the overall estimate of 
representativeness in committee-sophisticated settings is .19 units 
greater than under the assumption of sincere committee behavior. The 
comparable difference in Sample II reverses, but even then the 
obstructed outcome is superior in over one-third of the situations. 
Thus even though the value of the status quo parameter affects the 
ratio of good to bad obstructions, the frequent existence of highly 
representative outcomes from obstruction is not merely an artifact of 
the parameter value. In short, obstruction is often good, and we 
therefore have a preliminary basis for rejecting the null hypothesis. 
To obtain a better idea of how many outcomes were better or worse 
under the assumption of committee-sophisticated obstruction, and by 
how much, Figure 4 shows the difference in representativeness, 
R cs Rsv' for each ripe case in each sample. A positive value means 
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the outcome under sincere voting is better; a negative value means the 
outcome under committee sophistication is better. Dark bars represent 
observations from Sample I, and light bars represent Sample II. These 
data are of course consistent with the numerical data in Table 1; 
Sample I cases tend to fall to the left of the dotted line while 
Sample II cases more frequently lie to the right. But the figure also 
provides information not discernible from the overall averages. 
First, there are several instances in which the difference in the 
representativeness of outcomes varies quite greatly from one 
behavioral assumption to the other. Both tails of the distribution 
show several absolute values of greater than one unit. Thus while the 
average difference in representativeness under the two assumptions 
suggests that obstruction may be inconsequential in general, there are 
nevertheless many specific cases in which its occurrence substantially 
changes the level of representativeness. Moreover, even in the Sample 
I, in which the performance of the nonobstructive committee tends to 
be better, there are many instances in which the difference in 
representativeness is negative. So even in those settings in which 
myopic committee behavior tends to increase representativeness, the 
favorable consequences of such behavior are by no means sure bets. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether the simulated situations 
that produce these results are realistic, given our day-to-day 
knowledge of Congress. To help make such a judgment, Figure Sa shows 
the first (and typical) case of several randomly drawn and closely 
inspected situations. Solid dots again denote ideal points of 
21 
committee members, of whom there are three, and hollow dots represent 
noncommittee members' ideal points. The party affiliation of the 
members (L or R) is given below the appropriate dots and above the 
units of the policy scale. 
The distribution of preferences seems realistic. L-party members 
indeed tend have ideal points on the left of the scale (with one 
exception -- a Southern Democrat perhaps), and R-party members are 
more tightly clustered on the right. The situation is clearly ripe for 
obstruction since I CM-S I < I CM-FM I , which implies that the committee 
median voter prefers the status quo to the ideal point of the floor 
median voter. Thus the sophisticated committee obstructs and Ocs 
Although the situation is identical for the committee whose members 
s. 
vote sincerely, that committee reports legislation that is amended to 
FM, hence 0 =FM. But this outcome is quite far from p*. (The line sv 
segments, L, from p* to O reflect the loss in representativeness, as 
defined in equation (2).) In contrast, the obstructed outcome, 
* Ocs = S, is considerably closer to P than is Osv· The difference in 
representativeness, therefore, is a substantial -1.29. 
Although nothing about this example seems implausible, we need 
not rely exclusively on impressionistic judgments of abstract cases in 
order to argue that simulated situations approximate those in 
congressional politics. Well before this simulation was run, an 
account of the House's action on the 1983 Justice Department 
Authorization Bill (S 951) was given in Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report.11 The Senate, in passing its bill, had included a 
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controversial amendment to virtually end court-ordered busing for the 
purpose of achieving racial balance in schools. The bill then went to 
Congressman Peter Rodina's Judiciary Committee in the House. Figure 
Sb shows � priori estimates of the relevant points in this situation: 
the preferences, bill, and status quo point. The policy dimension is 
simply that of the most salient feature of the legislation (according 
to .Q.Q). To the left of the scale is completely forced busing, in the 
extreme, say, for all schools irrespective of any special 
circumstances. On the far right is no busing for racial purposes 
under any circumstances, court-ordered or otherwise. In a real 
legislature, as in the simulated one, these extreme positions are not 
likely to be taken by many members, but in any case the more important 
median points are more centrally located. The Judiciary Committee, 
which is relatively liberal, has a median position towards the left 
side of the scale, with the status quo position to its right but still 
left of center. The floor median position is farther to the right, 
since turnover in the House following the 1980 election made its 
members somewhat more conservative in general, and since busing in 
particular was probably declining in popularity at the time. This 
certainly is the case if the Senate's bill is any guide, and 
accordingly, it is also placed on the right side of the scale. 
The theory in its present state has no provisions for 
bicameralism, but in this instance the location of the Senate' s bill 
is unimportant. The striking point is the similarity between the 
simulated situation in Figure Sa and the actual one in Figure Sb. As 
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the theory predicts, so did Rodina's committee act. It killed the 
bill. 
* 
The omission in the example is the House's P • The reason for 
its exclusion is simply the inability of presently available 
techniques to measure preferences on such specific issues. But in 
spite of this methodological limitation, it is probable that in this 
example, or in others like it of which there surely are many, the true 
p* is skewed well towards the CM side of the FM position. So long as 
this is the case sometimes -- whether or not it was the case with 
respect to the authorization legislation in question -- we can be 
certain that events in which obstruction aids representativeness do 
occur. The simulation model gives us an idea of how often such 
situations arise, and under its assumptions the frequency is 
significant. But more importantly, the technique and underlying 
theory reveal how and why these nonobvious events occur. 
Although the focus of the analysis thus far has been on the 
nonobvious events, it of course does not follow that obstruction is 
indisputably good and ought to be encouraged without qualification. 
That is, even though we can comfortably reject the null hypothesis, we 
ought not perfunctorily accept its natural alternative that 
obstruction consistently leads to representative outcomes. To the 
contrary, it bears repeating that the simulation model also generates 
many situations in which obstruction has more intuitive, negative 
consequences. Figure Sc shows how obstruction can also preclude what 
otherwise would have been healthy convergence to a more representative 
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floor median point. Here the committee's obstruction, as always, 
keeps the status quo in effect, but the status quo point is very far 
from P
*
. The outcome under sincere referral, in contrast, is near p
*
, 
and therefore Rsv is much greater than Res· 
EXTENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
To begin to understand the implications of these findings for 
institutional design in general, and for congressional reform in 
particular, it should be emphasized that the key driving force in the 
theory is individual behavior, even though such behavior manifests 
itself in committee-characterizable ways. Just as individuals differ, 
so too do their strategies. Furthermore, various institutional 
features in Congress, such as the committee assignment process, tend 
to bring together members with relatively high or low levels of 
strategic capabilities. Thus members of some committees are naturally 
more inclined than others to coordinate their individual strategies 
and to exercise committee-sophisticated strategies. Reformers would 
be hard pressed to change these inclinations, even if the findings 
were sufficiently conclusive to suggest, for example, that obstructive 
behavior always ought to be suppressed. But we now know, that the 
problem is not that simple. Sometimes obstruction is indeed 
offensive, even according to an objective criterion such as 
representativeness. But more often it appears to be innocuous or even 
favorable in terms of the representativeness of outcomes. So the 
reformers' puzzle ought not be how to ban obstruction, but rather how 
to circumvent only the most unrepresentative obstructions. In this 
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section we shall see how two informal extensions of the model -- one 
institutional and one strategic -- not only address this reformulated 
puzzle, but also provide for a more realistic depiction of Congress as 
we know it. 
The discharge petition. The U.S. House of Representatives has 
had since 1910 an institutional mechanism that seeks to solve the 
restated puzzle. The discharge petition provides that if a bill has 
been before a standing committee for at least 30 days, a congressman 
can introduce a motion to force it out of the committee. The House 
clerk then prepares a petition, which, if signed by 218 members of the 
House within a specified time, places the measure on a special 
Discharge Calandar. After seven days, any member who signed the 
petition may be recognized to offer a discharge motion. If the motion 
passes, any member who signed the petition can force immediate 
consideration of the bill. If the motion fails, the bill can no 
longer be considered during that session.12 We can therefore view the 
discharge petition as not only a mechanism for overcoming obstruction, 
but also as a decentralizing institutional feature in the sense that 
it provides opportunites for all members to act on otherwise 
obstructed and hence untouchable legislation. Thus, unlike 
noncommittee members in our simple model, members of Congress who are 
willing to expend the time and effort may resurrect legislation which 
in the model was dead, 
By any obvious measure of success, the discharge petition 
historically has been unsuccessful. Although 909 petitions have been 
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filed since 1910, only 26 bills have actually been discharged, 20 of 
which ultimately passed. More recently, since 1973 only one bill has 
been discharged, and it did not pass.13 While this information raises 
doubts about the importance of this particular institutional feature, 
and especially about the part it plays in the post-reform Congress, we 
should not ignore the discharge petition on the basis of empirical 
data without first inspecting it theoretically. Specifically, answers 
to three questions may yield a broader generalization about 
institutional design. They are: When is the petition most likely to 
be used? What are its probable effects on representativeness in those 
situations? And what might be its effect apart from its use? 
Theoretically guided, educated assumptions lead us to an answer 
to the first question. We know of course that discharge attempts will 
occur only when there is something to discharge, that is.. in terms of 
our theory, when a bill is obstructed by a sophisticated committee. 
From the definition of ripeness for obstruction, we know further that 
the committee median voter prefers S to FM, as in Figure 6a, for 
example.14 To answer the question of which such situations are most 
likely to result in successful discharge attempts, we need to know 
where other members are located on the policy dimension. Consider two 
extreme cases. In Figure 6b, most members to the right of FM are 
barely to its right, while members to its left are well to its left 
and for the most part satisfied with existing policy (S). Although 
discharge, theoretically, would be successful in such a situation 
since a majority does indeed prefer the outcome under successful 
discharge (Od = FM) to the obstructed outcome (Ocs = S), it seems 
unlikely that so many members with so little to gain will go to the 
trouble of mounting a campaign against the committee. Deference to 
committees, while perhaps declining since the reforms of the '70s, 
still exists to some degree. 
In contrast, a discharge attempt is much more likely in Figure 
6c, where many members who dislike S dislike it very much, so their 
ideal points lie on the extreme right of the scale. The critical 
difference in the two situations is easy to visualize and summarize. 
Not merely the number of members who oppose the status quo, but more 
importantly the degree to which they oppose the status quo (as 
reflected here by distance), is likely to determine whether a 
discharge campaign will be mounted. 
If this reasoning is correct, then what can be said about 
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discharge and representativeness? Figure 6 provides a clear answer to 
this question also. The representative point was defined to be 
sensitive to changes in any and all members' preferences. Therefore, 
in the examples in Figure 6, the location of p* varies. In 6c where 
* preferences of disillusioned noncommittee members are extreme, P is 
much farther to the right than it is in 6b where noncommittee members' 
disillusionment is less severe. For precisely this reason, the gain 
in representativeness from a successful discharge is positive and 
large (1.00) in 6c, in contrast to the moderate negative gain in 6b 
where discharge is improbable. In summary, the examples in Figure 6 
vividly suggest that when discharge is most likely to occur, it is 
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also likely to improve the representativeness of outcomes. Thus the 
institutional extension of the original model provision for 
discharge -- further reduces the plausibility of the null hypothesis. 
Enhanced committee sophistication. Subsequent to the conjecture 
that discharge, while rare, is probably good is the additional 
possibility that the discharge petition has effects even when it is 
not used. The possibility is demonstrated by expanding the definition 
of committee sophistication to include committee members' greater 
awareness of, and willingness to act on, preferences of noncommittee 
members. Recall that obstructive committees are sophisticated. 
According to the simple model, this merely requires that they know the 
ideal point of the floor median voter. If, however, we assume that 
their sophistication is slightly greater -- namely, that they are also 
attuned to the preferences of other floor members as well -- then they 
also are able to detect situations in which discharge is likely and 
hence in which their inclination to obstruct is risky. Fortunately, 
there is at least some evidence that the line of reasoning advanced 
here at a theoretical level has an empirical basis. Jewell and 
Patterson write that 
The discharge procedure, particularly in the House, has a utility 
that is not measurable in the number of discharged bills, 
however. When the signatures on a discharge petition begin to 
approach a majority, a committee may decide to jump before it is 
pushed, and report the desired bill to the House. In 1960 and 
again in 1963, a campaign for signatures helped to persuade 
Chairman Smith of the Rules Committee to hold hearings on civil 
rights bills that had been stalled in his committee (1966, p.261; 
see also Gross, 1953, pp.331-2). 
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Thus, in practice, sophisticated committees do not always obstruct. 
Moreover, when they decline this strategic opportunity in ripe 
situations, the reason probably is that they have a sense of the 
preferences of noncommittee members other than the median voter. When 
discharge petitions are circulating, preferences of signing members 
are generally easy to discern. But even in the absence of such floor 
activity, the most attentive committee members are probably adept at 
* 
estimating the location of P • If so, then their deviations from 
their tendency to obstruct legislation in ripe situations is likely to 
result in more representative outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
Although much of the preceding discussion has relied more on 
argument than on systematically collected data, joint consideration of 
the argument, the simulation results, and a few genuine congressional 
cases, continues to reduce our suspicions about obstruction by 
standing committees. Similarly, the null hypothesis that obstruction 
undermines the representativeness of outcomes seems less and less 
attractive. Caution dictates that we stop short of rejecting 
reformist sentiments that some decentralization is good, but we 
reiterate that these results indicate that the gains from 
decentralization are minimal and often indirect. As members of 
Congress are increasingly attentive, indeed reactive, to costs 
associated with decentralizing reforms, it should not surprise us to 
observe a recentralizing trend in Congress (Vogler, 1981; Plattner, 
1983a, 1983b). More surprising, however, is the genuine possibility 
that recentralization will result in more representative outcomes. 
Finally, it appears quite possible, if not likely, that for a 
large class of democratic institutions, minimally decentralizing 
institutional features confer to ordinary members opportunities for 
correcting the excesses of sophisticated behavior by an 
institutionally advantaged few. Perhaps more often than we realize, 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The definitions that follow are, with minor exceptions, verbal. 
Formal definitions and theoretical results can be found in 
Shepsle (1979), Krehbiel (1983) and Denzau and Mackay (1983), 
although formalizations and assumptions differ somewhat in the 
various works. 
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the mere existence of such features prevents the most offensive 2. For purposes of clarity in exposition, the number of legislators 
exercises of centralized sophistication, such as obstruction. In most is assumed to be odd. 
of the remainini instances, obstruction is no necessary enemy of 
representativeness, and, more generally, monitored centralization is 
no necessary enemy of good outcomes. In our continued attempts to 
study the qualitative consequences of various institutional 
arrangements, our challenge is to bring better evidence to bear on 
such suppositions. This research demonstrates that an approach that 
emphasizes formal models of key institutional features offers some 
preliminary insights, and that simulation is a useful technique for 
seeking tentative confirmation or rejection of hypotheses. I hasten 
to add, however, that ultimately, verification of such insights via 
the collection and analysis of "real" congressional data remains a 
high priority. 
3. Specifically, clause 7 of Rule XVI of the House, "On Motions, 
Their Precedence, etc." states that " • • •  no motion or 
proposition on a subject different from that under consideration 
shall be admitted under color of amendment. "  See Romer and 
Rosenthal (1978), Krehbiel (1983) and Denzau and Mackay (1983) 
for similar theories in closed rule settings. 
4. A number of terms for this form of voting are synonomous in 
social choice theory; sincere, straightforward, myopic, and naive 
are the most common. 
5. The strategy of committee members is not affected by their 
expectations regarding sophistication of members on the floor. A 
theorem by McKelvey and Niemi (1978) states that if a Condorcet 
winner exists, then sophisticated behavior ensures its selection. 
Since FM is a Condorcet winner (Black, 1958), the committee 
expects the floor outcome to be FM under either of these 
behavioral assumptions. See Denzau and Mackay (1983) for a 
discussion of committee decision making under uncertainty in a 
nearly identical institutional setting. 
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6. In each case, these parameter values are straightforward linear 
transformations of the COPE scores. Furthermore, sensitivity 
testing indicates that such values can be changed substantially 
without affecting the results. See Krehbiel (1983), chapter 4. 
7. Sensitivity testing using a variety of committee sizes, total 
membership, and ratios of committee to total membership also 
indicates that the simulation model is robust. 
8. Although the analysis is of one unidimensional situation at a 
time, the formal properties of SIAs are such that the results are 
generalizable to N committees, N jurisdictions, and an N­
dimensional policy space. 
9. The computer program is written in SIMULA, an Algol-based 
programming language, and executed on a DEC-10 computer. 
10. Although one unit on the scale of representativeness may seem 
quite small, the theoretical minimum of representativeness, 0, is 
empirically absurd, since this would require that all members 
would have preferences on one extreme end of the scale while the 
outcome is on the other extreme end. Of the several thousand 
simulations run during sensitivity testing and for the analysis 
reported here, (including many institutional arrangements that 
tend to be less representative than those operating under the 
open rule), R was never under 6.0. In these samples, it is 
always above 7.0. 
11. See "97th Congress: Shorter Session, Fewer Laws," Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report, October 16, 1982, p. 2688. 
12. See Oleszek (1978) pp. 96-7.
13. See Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Congress, (3rd edition) 
pp. 425-6. 
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14. The status quo point, S, could be to the left of CM, or, of 
course, the entire configuration could be flipped over from right 
to left, but neither of these possibilities affects the argument. 
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Table 1 
Representativeness in Situations 
Ripe for Obstruction 
Averages: Ns and Pets: 
Sample N Ripe Rsv Res Rsv-Rcs Rsv>Rcs Rcs>Rsv 
303 9.41 9.60 -.19 113 (37) 190 ( 63) 
I I 251 9.40 9.01 .39 164 (65) 87 (35) 
Rsv = average representativeness under sincere voting 
Res = average representativeness under committee sophistication 
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